Sensitivity, safety, and antiluck epistemology

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This article analyses antiluck epistemology, and sensitivity-based and safety-based theories of knowledge in relation to skepticism. It suggests that the main motivation for sensitivity-based theories of knowledge is that they seem to offer a very neat resolution of at least one form of the skeptical problem. The problem with the use of sensitivity-based theories in responding to radical skepticism is that the closure principle is highly intuitive, intuitive that many feel that rejecting closure is too costly a price to pay for a resolution of the skeptical challenge.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
EditorsJohn Greco
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages1-22
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9780199892020
ISBN (Print)9780195183214
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Sep 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Antiluck epistemology
  • Closure principle
  • Skepticism
  • Theories of knowledge

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