Sensitivity, safety, and antiluck epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0021

Sensitivity, safety, and antiluck epistemology

Duncan Pritchard^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This article analyses antiluck epistemology, and sensitivity-based and safety-based theories of knowledge in relation to skepticism. It suggests that the main motivation for sensitivity-based theories of knowledge is that they seem to offer a very neat resolution of at least one form of the skeptical problem. The problem with the use of sensitivity-based theories in responding to radical skepticism is that the closure principle is highly intuitive, intuitive that many feel that rejecting closure is too costly a price to pay for a resolution of the skeptical challenge.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
Editors	John Greco
Place of Publication	Oxford
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	1-22
Number of pages	22
ISBN (Electronic)	9780199892020
ISBN (Print)	9780195183214
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0021
Publication status	Published - 2 Sep 2009
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Antiluck epistemology
Closure principle
Skepticism
Theories of knowledge

Access to Document

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0021

Link to publication in Scopus

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Cite this

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