Sensitivity, safety, and antiluck epistemology

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


This article analyses antiluck epistemology, and sensitivity-based and safety-based theories of knowledge in relation to skepticism. It suggests that the main motivation for sensitivity-based theories of knowledge is that they seem to offer a very neat resolution of at least one form of the skeptical problem. The problem with the use of sensitivity-based theories in responding to radical skepticism is that the closure principle is highly intuitive, intuitive that many feel that rejecting closure is too costly a price to pay for a resolution of the skeptical challenge.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Skepticism
EditorsJohn Greco
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9780199892020
ISBN (Print)9780195183214
Publication statusPublished - 2 Sept 2009
Externally publishedYes


  • Antiluck epistemology
  • Closure principle
  • Skepticism
  • Theories of knowledge


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