Separating reputation, social influence, and identification effects in a dictator game

Maroš Servátka*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators' actions than the social influence and identification.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-209
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume53
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2009
Externally publishedYes

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