Setting the Facts Straight

Mark Jago*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


Substantial facts (or states of affairs) are not well-understood entities. Many philosophers object to their existence on this basis. Yet facts, if they can be understood, promise to do a lot of philosophical work: they can be used to construct theories of property possession and truthmaking, for example. Here, I give a formal theory of facts, including negative and logically complex facts. I provide a theory of reduction similar to that of the typed λ-calculus and use it to provide identity conditions for facts. This theory validates truthmaker maximalism: it provides truthmakers for all truths. I then show how the usual truth-in-a-model relation can be replaced by two relations: one between models and facts, saying that a given fact obtains relative to the model, and the other between facts and propositions: the truthmaking relation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)33-54
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2011


  • λ-calculus
  • Facts
  • Negative facts
  • Ontology
  • Properties
  • Reduction
  • States of affairs
  • Truthmaking


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