TY - CHAP
T1 - Shared remembering and distributed affect
T2 - varieties of psychological interdependence
AU - Sutton, John
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - A significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence: our cognitive and affective states are related to and mutually influence those of certain other people. What each of us feels and remembers, what matters to each of us about present and past, and the way we imagine and plan for the future, is influenced by what those others feel, remember, and care about. This chapter builds on recent suggestions that both remembering and feeling are in certain circumstances worldly or socially shared activities rather than entirely internal. I ask how social aspects of memory relate to the distributed nature of affective phenomena such as emotions and moods. Identifying four ways in which distributed affect implicates distinctive forms of memory, the chapter goes on to assess what is ‘shared’ in cases of socially distributed memory, emotion, and action. Arguing that there are many forms of psychological interdependence, I make the case that complementary or meshing relations between people in different cognitive and affective states are often more significant than convergence or synchrony across interacting individuals.
AB - A significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence: our cognitive and affective states are related to and mutually influence those of certain other people. What each of us feels and remembers, what matters to each of us about present and past, and the way we imagine and plan for the future, is influenced by what those others feel, remember, and care about. This chapter builds on recent suggestions that both remembering and feeling are in certain circumstances worldly or socially shared activities rather than entirely internal. I ask how social aspects of memory relate to the distributed nature of affective phenomena such as emotions and moods. Identifying four ways in which distributed affect implicates distinctive forms of memory, the chapter goes on to assess what is ‘shared’ in cases of socially distributed memory, emotion, and action. Arguing that there are many forms of psychological interdependence, I make the case that complementary or meshing relations between people in different cognitive and affective states are often more significant than convergence or synchrony across interacting individuals.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85048697886&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85048697886
SN - 9781138065604
T3 - Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy
SP - 181
EP - 199
BT - New directions in the philosophy of memory
A2 - Michaelian, Kourken
A2 - Debus, Dorothea
A2 - Perrin, Denis
PB - Taylor & Francis
CY - London
ER -