Simulating the Lausanne peace negotiations, 1922-1923: power asymmetries in bargaining

Nimet Beriker, Daniel Druckman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The negotiation leading to the historic Lausanne Peace Treaty provides a setting for exploring the impacts of different power configurations on bargaining behavior. Symmetric and asymmetric coalition structures existed on two key issues in the talks, passage through the straits and the question of civil rights for minorities. A content analysis of the transcripts showed some differences in bargaining behavior between the two power structures. These structures were simulated and compared to a third condition, bilateral negotiations between parties of equal power Opposing negotiators in the symmetric parties condition were more satisfied with the outcome, achieved faster resolutions, disagreed less, and made fewer competitive statements during the discussions than negotiators from these countries in the coalition conditions. Both similarities and differences were found in the comparison between the processes and outcomes in the actual and simulated negotiations. The results have implications for designing structures that improve negotiations and illustrate some advantages of experimental simulation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-183
Number of pages22
JournalSimulation and Gaming
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1996
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Alternative power structures
  • Experimental simulation
  • Lausanne peace negotiations
  • Negotiating behavior
  • Perceptions and attitudes
  • Process analysis

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