Socially extended epistemology

J. Adam Carter (Editor), Andy Clark (Editor), Jesper Kallestrup (Editor), S. Orestis Palermos (Editor), Duncan Pritchard (Editor)

Research output: Book/ReportEdited Book/Anthologypeer-review

Abstract

The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memory in old partners, problem-solving by juries, and the behaviors of hiring committees, scientific research teams, and intelligence agencies. This volume attempts to further our understanding of socially extended knowledge while also exploring its potential practical and societal impact by inviting perspectives not just from philosophy but from cognitive science, computer science, Web science, and cybernetics too. Contributions to the volume mostly fall within two broad categories: (i) foundational issues within socially extended epistemology (including elaborations on, defences and criticisms of core aspects of socially extended epistemology), and (ii) applications and new directions, where themes in socially extended epistemology are connected to these other areas of research. The volume is accordingly divided into two parts corresponding to these broad categories. The topics themselves are of great conceptual interest, and wider interdisciplinary perspectives suggest many connections with social concerns and policy-making.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationOxford, UK
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages318
ISBN (Print)9780198801764
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes

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