Technology, team production and incentives

Vladimir Smirnov, Andrew Wait*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Incentive reversal (IR) is when higher rewards induce some agents to reduce their effort (Winter 2009). We show that IR can hold for all agents when: there is an improvement in production technology; and rewards are based on team output. Whilst IR requires at least one worker's marginal return to be decreasing in team productivity when agents invest simultaneously, this is not necessary with sequential investments. Rather, IR can occur with sequential investment when the marginal return of effort for all agents is increasing with improvements in technology.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)91-94
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume141
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • incentive reversal
  • moral hazard in teams
  • productivity
  • technology

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