Tendering and Bidding for Access: A Regulator's Guide to Auctions

Flavio M. Menezes, Rohan Pitchford, Andrew Wait

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Tenders and traditional auctions are increasingly being used in regulation; as a consequence it is essential regulators have an understanding of the basics of auction theory. There is no simple prescription for the design of an auction or tender that will fit all situations; moreover, the costs from inappropriate auction and tender design can be high For example, while a second-price sealed bid auction is efficient in the absence of collusion, if participants can collude then such auction formats can result in very low revenue. Low revenue can also result with a second-price auction when there are few bidders and no reserve price.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)345-370
Number of pages26
JournalAustralian Journal of Management
Volume28
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • AUCTIONS
  • REGULATION
  • TENDERS

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