Abstract
This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in animals (which presupposes concept possession) and the existence of self-consciousness. I present three discussions to support the hypothesis: an analogy between perception and conception, where both are self-specifying; an argument that any web of concepts will always include the self-concept; and a fresh interpretation of Bermũdez (1998) showing how his theory of non-conceptual content provides strong support for the concept possession hypothesis.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 713-720 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Consciousness and cognition |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Animal awareness
- Concept
- Intelligence
- Mental representation
- Non-conceptual content
- Self-awareness
- Self-consciousness