The Concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness

Stephane Savanah

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in animals (which presupposes concept possession) and the existence of self-consciousness. I present three discussions to support the hypothesis: an analogy between perception and conception, where both are self-specifying; an argument that any web of concepts will always include the self-concept; and a fresh interpretation of Bermũdez (1998) showing how his theory of non-conceptual content provides strong support for the concept possession hypothesis.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)713-720
Number of pages8
JournalConsciousness and cognition
Volume21
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Animal awareness
  • Concept
  • Intelligence
  • Mental representation
  • Non-conceptual content
  • Self-awareness
  • Self-consciousness

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