The effect of the general anti-avoidance rule on corporate tax avoidance in China

Sidney C.M. Leung; Grant Richardson; Grantley Taylor

doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2018.12.005

The effect of the general anti-avoidance rule on corporate tax avoidance in China

Sidney C.M. Leung^*, Grant Richardson, Grantley Taylor

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines the effect of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), introduced on January 1, 2008, to enforce corporate tax avoidance laws in China. Based on a sample of 517 Chinese firms over the 2006–2010 period (2585 firm-years), we find a reduction in tax avoidance following the implementation of the GAAR that appears to be the result of the new and stringent tax legislation and the consolidation of Chinese tax law. We also observe that the effects of firms’ engaging a Big Four auditor and directors with tax expertise in deterring tax avoidance significantly decreased following implementation of the GAAR. To all intents and purposes, it seems that the implementation of the GAAR in China has moderated the effects of and substituted for these particular monitoring and disciplining mechanisms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	105-117
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics
Volume	15
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2018.12.005
Publication status	Published - 1 Apr 2019

Keywords

China
Corporate tax avoidance
General anti-avoidance rule (GAAR)

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10.1016/j.jcae.2018.12.005

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abstract = "This study examines the effect of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), introduced on January 1, 2008, to enforce corporate tax avoidance laws in China. Based on a sample of 517 Chinese firms over the 2006–2010 period (2585 firm-years), we find a reduction in tax avoidance following the implementation of the GAAR that appears to be the result of the new and stringent tax legislation and the consolidation of Chinese tax law. We also observe that the effects of firms{\textquoteright} engaging a Big Four auditor and directors with tax expertise in deterring tax avoidance significantly decreased following implementation of the GAAR. To all intents and purposes, it seems that the implementation of the GAAR in China has moderated the effects of and substituted for these particular monitoring and disciplining mechanisms.",

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N2 - This study examines the effect of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), introduced on January 1, 2008, to enforce corporate tax avoidance laws in China. Based on a sample of 517 Chinese firms over the 2006–2010 period (2585 firm-years), we find a reduction in tax avoidance following the implementation of the GAAR that appears to be the result of the new and stringent tax legislation and the consolidation of Chinese tax law. We also observe that the effects of firms’ engaging a Big Four auditor and directors with tax expertise in deterring tax avoidance significantly decreased following implementation of the GAAR. To all intents and purposes, it seems that the implementation of the GAAR in China has moderated the effects of and substituted for these particular monitoring and disciplining mechanisms.

AB - This study examines the effect of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), introduced on January 1, 2008, to enforce corporate tax avoidance laws in China. Based on a sample of 517 Chinese firms over the 2006–2010 period (2585 firm-years), we find a reduction in tax avoidance following the implementation of the GAAR that appears to be the result of the new and stringent tax legislation and the consolidation of Chinese tax law. We also observe that the effects of firms’ engaging a Big Four auditor and directors with tax expertise in deterring tax avoidance significantly decreased following implementation of the GAAR. To all intents and purposes, it seems that the implementation of the GAAR in China has moderated the effects of and substituted for these particular monitoring and disciplining mechanisms.

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The effect of the general anti-avoidance rule on corporate tax avoidance in China

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Keywords

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