The Enforcement of rulings of the Supreme Court on judicial independence in Bangladesh

when enforcer becomes violator

M. Rafiqul Islam, S. M. Solaiman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Yet, more than 30 years after the founding of the modern state of Bangladesh, the judiciary remains subservient to an all-powerful executive. Between 1997-2001, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued binding judicial directives requiring the government immediately to separate the judiciary from the control of the executive. However, the government has adopted a strategy of procrastination and this has resulted in a public crisis of confidence in the state of the judiciary. This article explains why such a separation is indispensable for achieving judicial independence and considers why the executive is unwilling to establish a truly independent judiciory in Bangladesh.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-126
Number of pages20
JournalAustralian journal of Asian law
Volume4
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2002

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