Abstract
The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Yet, more than 30 years after the founding of the modern state of Bangladesh, the judiciary remains subservient to an all-powerful executive. Between 1997-2001, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued binding judicial directives requiring the government immediately to separate the judiciary from the control of the executive. However, the government has adopted a strategy of procrastination and this has resulted in a public crisis of confidence in the state of the judiciary. This article explains why such a separation is indispensable for achieving judicial independence and considers why the executive is unwilling to establish a truly independent judiciory in Bangladesh.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 107-126 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Australian Journal of Asian Law |
Volume | 4 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - 2002 |