The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Yet, more than 30 years after the founding of the modern state of Bangladesh, the judiciary remains subservient to an all-powerful executive. Between 1997-2001, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued binding judicial directives requiring the government immediately to separate the judiciary from the control of the executive. However, the government has adopted a strategy of procrastination and this has resulted in a public crisis of confidence in the state of the judiciary. This article explains why such a separation is indispensable for achieving judicial independence and considers why the executive is unwilling to establish a truly independent judiciory in Bangladesh.
|Number of pages||20|
|Journal||Australian journal of Asian law|
|Publication status||Published - 2002|
Islam, M. R., & Solaiman, S. M. (2002). The Enforcement of rulings of the Supreme Court on judicial independence in Bangladesh: when enforcer becomes violator. Australian journal of Asian law, 4(2), 107-126.