Abstract
The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental feature of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Yet, more than 30 years after the founding of the modern state of Bangladesh, the judiciary remains subservient to an all-powerful executive. Between 1997-2001, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued binding judicial directives requiring the government immediately to separate the judiciary from the control of the executive. However, the government has adopted a strategy of procrastination and this has resulted in a public crisis of confidence in the state of the judiciary. This article explains why such a separation is indispensable for achieving judicial independence and considers why the executive is unwilling to establish a truly independent judiciory in Bangladesh.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 107-126 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Australian Journal of Asian Law |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 |
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'The Enforcement of rulings of the Supreme Court on judicial independence in Bangladesh: when enforcer becomes violator'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver