The evolutionary gene and the extended evolutionary synthesis

Qiaoying Lu, Pierrick Bourrat

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Advocates of an ‘extended evolutionary synthesis’ have claimed that standard evolutionary theory fails to accommodate epigenetic inheritance. The opponents of the extended synthesis argue that the evidence for epigenetic inheritance causing adaptive evolution in nature is insufficient. We suggest that the ambiguity surrounding the conception of the gene represents a background semantic issue in the debate. Starting from Haig’s gene-selectionist framework and Griffiths and Neumann-Held’s notion of the evolutionary gene, we define senses of ‘gene’, ‘environment’ and ‘phenotype’ in a way that makes them consistent with gene-centric evolutionary theory. We argue that the evolutionary gene, when being materialized, need not be restricted to nucleic acids but can encompass other heritable units such as epialleles. If the evolutionary gene is understood more broadly, and the notions of environment and phenotype are defined accordingly, current evolutionary theory does not require a major conceptual change in order to incorporate the mechanisms of epigenetic inheritance.
LanguageEnglish
Pages775-800
Number of pages26
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume69
Issue number3
Early online date20 Apr 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2018

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Gene
Evolutionary
Evolutionary Synthesis
Epigenetics
Evolutionary Theory
Phenotype
Opponents
Conception
Conceptual Change

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The evolutionary gene and the extended evolutionary synthesis. / Lu, Qiaoying; Bourrat, Pierrick.

In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 69, No. 3, 01.09.2018, p. 775-800.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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