This paper explores the expansion of outside directorate in Korean corporations, analyzing workplace survey data collected by the Korea Labor Institute(KLI). The previous literate on this issue empathizes how the changing legal environments of Korean business affect the aspect of controlling corporate agencies, executive officers. The results of this study reconfirm that Korean corporations appoint more outside directors to monitor and control managers. Drawing on resource dependency and neo-institutional perspectives, we argue that other significant factors also increase the size of outside board. A company may recruit more outside directors to decrease resource uncertainty and dependency as well as to acquire more legitimacy from the environments. There exist different dynamics of appointing outside directors between listed and unlisted corporations. Listed companies hire outside board members and attempt to attract fundings from foreign shareholders. In contrast, unlisted corporations recruit outside directors while conforming to the business norms and guidelines. We conclude that functional requirements affect the expansion of outside directorate in listed corporations and institutional factors guide unlisted corporations to appoint more outside directors.
|Number of pages||40|
|Journal||Korean Journal of Sociology|
|Publication status||Published - 2007|
- outside board directors
- agency control
- resource dependency
- business norm