Abstract
We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuroscience explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are explored.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 601-627 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |