Abstract
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the “natural” compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 776–801 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 18 Aug 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- compatibilism
- experimental philosophy
- free will