The modal account of luck

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1111/meta.12103

The modal account of luck

Duncan Pritchard^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

86 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work (e.g., Pritchard 2005). In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck (and risk) ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions over competing proposals, such as the lack of control account.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	594-619
Number of pages	26
Journal	Metaphilosophy
Volume	45
Issue number	4-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12103
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

epistemic luck
epistemology
knowledge
luck
risk

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10.1111/meta.12103

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KW - risk

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The modal account of luck

Abstract

Keywords

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