The modal account of luck

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work (e.g., Pritchard 2005). In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck (and risk) ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions over competing proposals, such as the lack of control account.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)594-619
Number of pages26
JournalMetaphilosophy
Volume45
Issue number4-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2014
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • epistemic luck
  • epistemology
  • knowledge
  • luck
  • risk

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The modal account of luck'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this