Abstract
This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work (e.g., Pritchard 2005). In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck (and risk) ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions over competing proposals, such as the lack of control account.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 594-619 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Metaphilosophy |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue number | 4-5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- epistemic luck
- epistemology
- knowledge
- luck
- risk