The naval balance in the South China Sea

The South China Sea has emerged as a major flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific region over the past 15 years. Coercion, fait accompli, and gray zone strategies have become part of a new normal, fueling increased risks of escalation and confrontation. This rise in tensions has been underpinned by a major transformation of the local naval balance of power among claimants and stakeholders. The driving factor behind this evolution has undoubtedly been the ascent of China as a powerful naval power. The extraordinarily rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy that has taken place over the last quarter of a century has given Beijing the means to increasingly prevent other powers, and most notably the United States, from freely operating in the region and envision a possible bid for dominance over the maritime subregion. At the same time, the capacity of the US Navy to command the sea has eroded, though Washington retains and has taken steps to strengthen its ability to prevent a complete overtaking of the South China Sea by China. In this context, the other claimants have seen their relative weight erode. In spite of significant investments in their respective military apparatus, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Taiwan are left with few options as the balance of naval power continues to shift in China’s favor.