The negated conditional

A litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Simon J. Handley*, Jonathan St B T Evans, Valerie A. Thompson

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)559-569
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Volume32
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2006
Externally publishedYes

    Fingerprint

Cite this