The Rationalist Delusion?

a post hoc investigation

Jeanette Kennett, Philip Gerrans

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

What is a moral judgment? Jonathan Haidt and others who adopt a dual-process model of cognition see moral judgment as largely automatic and regard explicit reasoning as directed to the task of ex post facto justification and persuasion. This chapter argues that a capacity for diachronic agency is essential to moral deliberation and that once we focus on the full range of processes involved in moral decision-making it is not so clear that rationalism is undermined. In particular, initial, quick, affective moral judgments are just one input to moral decision-making, subject to moderation by social and rational pressures consistent with a broadly rationalist perspective.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMoral Brains
Subtitle of host publicationthe neuroscience of morality
EditorsS. Matthew Liao
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages74-86
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9780199357666
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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Keywords

  • moral reasoning
  • intuition
  • social intuitionist model
  • Jonathan Haidt
  • rationalism
  • dual process
  • moral judgment
  • diachronic agency
  • moral deliberation
  • decision-making

Cite this

Kennett, J., & Gerrans, P. (2016). The Rationalist Delusion? a post hoc investigation. In S. M. Liao (Ed.), Moral Brains: the neuroscience of morality (pp. 74-86). New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0003