The resistance of PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks

Sareh Emami; San Ling; Ivica Nikolić; Josef Pieprzyk; Huaxiong Wang

doi:10.1007/s12095-013-0096-8

The resistance of PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks

Sareh Emami, San Ling, Ivica Nikolić^*, Josef Pieprzyk, Huaxiong Wang

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Computing

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the security of the 64-bit lightweight block cipher PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks. With a computer search we are able to prove that for any related-key differential characteristic on full-round PRESENT-80, the probability of the characteristic only in the 64-bit state is not higher than 2^-64. To overcome the exponential (in the state and key sizes) computational complexity of the search we use truncated differences, however as the key schedule is not nibble oriented, we switch to actual differences and apply early abort techniques to prune the tree-based search. With a new method called extended split approach we are able to make the whole search feasible and we implement and run it in real time. Our approach targets the PRESENT-80 cipher however,with small modifications can be reused for other lightweight ciphers as well.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	171-187
Number of pages	17
Journal	Cryptography and Communications
Volume	6
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s12095-013-0096-8
Publication status	Published - Sep 2014

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The resistance of PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks

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