The sources of scepticism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems - a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal - at least when properly formulated - can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere - with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-227
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Volume6
Issue number2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • belief
  • closure
  • epistemological disjunctivism
  • hinge commitments
  • knowledge
  • perception
  • scepticism
  • underdetermination
  • Wittgenstein

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