I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche's later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): When an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this article I amend and clarify T to T'': When an intentional state with a subpropositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without a corresponding object, and that affect will generally be redeployed in a state with a distinct object. I then trace the development of the tenacity thesis through Nietzsche's early and middle works. Along the way, I discuss a number of related topics, including the scope of the tenacity thesis (does it apply to all intentional states?), the reflexive turn one often finds in Nietzsche's examples (why does he so often say the new object is oneself?), and the relations among will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.