Too big to fail?: The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016)

Diego Badell; Fabrizio Di Mascio; Alessandro Natalini; Edoardo Ongaro; Francesco Stolfi; Tamyko Ysa

doi:10.1080/14719037.2019.1618386

Too big to fail? The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016)

Diego Badell, Fabrizio Di Mascio^*, Alessandro Natalini, Edoardo Ongaro, Francesco Stolfi, Tamyko Ysa

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The article studies the dynamics of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms in Italy and Spain under the EU governance that took shape as a reaction to the Eurozone crisis. We show how three types of EU pressure–fiscal and economic coordination rules, conditionality, and back-room diplomacy have operated in conjunction. We also show that Italy was more willing than Spain to resist EU pressure. Based on a Two-Level Game framework, we argue that this can be explained by the greater opposition to European integration that has developed in Italy compared to Spain.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1307-1329
Number of pages	23
Journal	Public Management Review
Volume	21
Issue number	9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2019.1618386
Publication status	Published - 2 Sept 2019

Keywords

austerity
conditionality
cutback management
European Semester
fiscal retrenchment
sovereign debt crisis

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10.1080/14719037.2019.1618386

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Too big to fail? The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016)

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Keywords

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