Too big to fail?

The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016)

Diego Badell, Fabrizio Di Mascio*, Alessandro Natalini, Edoardo Ongaro, Francesco Stolfi, Tamyko Ysa

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The article studies the dynamics of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms in Italy and Spain under the EU governance that took shape as a reaction to the Eurozone crisis. We show how three types of EU pressure–fiscal and economic coordination rules, conditionality, and back-room diplomacy have operated in conjunction. We also show that Italy was more willing than Spain to resist EU pressure. Based on a Two-Level Game framework, we argue that this can be explained by the greater opposition to European integration that has developed in Italy compared to Spain.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1307-1329
Number of pages23
JournalPublic Management Review
Volume21
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Sep 2019

Keywords

  • austerity
  • conditionality
  • cutback management
  • European Semester
  • fiscal retrenchment
  • sovereign debt crisis

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