Too big to fail?: The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016)

Diego Badell, Fabrizio Di Mascio, Alessandro Natalini, Edoardo Ongaro, Francesco Stolfi, Tamyko Ysa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The article studies the dynamics of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms in Italy and Spain under the EU governance that took shape as a reaction to the Eurozone crisis. We show how three types of EU pressure–fiscal and economic coordination rules, conditionality, and back-room diplomacy have operated in conjunction. We also show that Italy was more willing than Spain to resist EU pressure. Based on a Two-Level Game framework, we argue that this can be explained by the greater opposition to European integration that has developed in Italy compared to Spain.

LanguageEnglish
Pages1307-1329
Number of pages23
JournalPublic Management Review
Volume21
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Sep 2019

Fingerprint

Consolidation
Economics
Spain
Too big to fail
Fiscal consolidation
Italy
Fiscal
Euro zone
Public sector reform
Governance
Conditionality
European integration
Two-level games
Diplomacy

Keywords

  • austerity
  • conditionality
  • cutback management
  • European Semester
  • fiscal retrenchment
  • sovereign debt crisis

Cite this

Badell, Diego ; Di Mascio, Fabrizio ; Natalini, Alessandro ; Ongaro, Edoardo ; Stolfi, Francesco ; Ysa, Tamyko. / Too big to fail? The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016). In: Public Management Review. 2019 ; Vol. 21, No. 9. pp. 1307-1329.
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Too big to fail? The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016). / Badell, Diego; Di Mascio, Fabrizio; Natalini, Alessandro; Ongaro, Edoardo; Stolfi, Francesco; Ysa, Tamyko.

In: Public Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 9, 02.09.2019, p. 1307-1329.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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