Towards a cognitive robotics

Andy Clark*, Rick Grush

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

148 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion of internal representation. This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and that (importantly) can be met by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the basic premises of the work (in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such scepticism in the first place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering an account (an example and something close to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal Robust Representationalism (MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about this notion. We end (Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our account, a science (e.g., robotics) may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5-16
Number of pages12
JournalAdaptive Behavior
Volume7
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Anti-representationalism
  • Feedback
  • Forward models
  • Motor control
  • Reactive systems
  • Representation

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