Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections

Roland Wen, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Electronic voting is rich with paradoxes. How can a voter verify that his own vote has been correctly counted, but at the same time be prevented from revealing his vote to a third party? Not only is there no generally recognised solution to those problems, it is not generally agreed how to specify precisely what the problems are, and what exact threats they pose. Such a situation is ripe for the application of Formal Methods. In this paper we explore so-called signature attacks, where an apparently secure system can nevertheless be manipulated to reveal a voter's choice in unexpected and subtle ways. We describe two examples in detail, and from that make proposals about where formal techniques might apply.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings
EditorsCliff Jones, Pekka Pihlajasaari, Jun Sun
Place of PublicationCham, Switzerland
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages595-610
Number of pages16
Volume8442 LNCS
ISBN (Print)9783319064093
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event19th International Symposium on Formal Methods, FM 2014 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 12 May 201416 May 2014

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume8442 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other19th International Symposium on Formal Methods, FM 2014
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period12/05/1416/05/14

Keywords

  • coercion
  • elections
  • signature attacks
  • single transferable vote

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  • Cite this

    Wen, R., McIver, A., & Morgan, C. (2014). Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections. In C. Jones, P. Pihlajasaari, & J. Sun (Eds.), FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings (Vol. 8442 LNCS, pp. 595-610). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8442 LNCS). Cham, Switzerland: Springer, Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40