Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections

Roland Wen; Annabelle McIver; Carroll Morgan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40

Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections

Roland Wen, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan

Department of Computing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Electronic voting is rich with paradoxes. How can a voter verify that his own vote has been correctly counted, but at the same time be prevented from revealing his vote to a third party? Not only is there no generally recognised solution to those problems, it is not generally agreed how to specify precisely what the problems are, and what exact threats they pose. Such a situation is ripe for the application of Formal Methods. In this paper we explore so-called signature attacks, where an apparently secure system can nevertheless be manipulated to reveal a voter's choice in unexpected and subtle ways. We describe two examples in detail, and from that make proposals about where formal techniques might apply.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings
Editors	Cliff Jones, Pekka Pihlajasaari, Jun Sun
Place of Publication	Cham, Switzerland
Publisher	Springer, Springer Nature
Pages	595-610
Number of pages	16
Volume	8442 LNCS
ISBN (Print)	9783319064093
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40
Publication status	Published - 2014
Event	19th International Symposium on Formal Methods, FM 2014 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 12 May 2014 → 16 May 2014

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	8442 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	03029743
ISSN (Electronic)	16113349

Other

Other	19th International Symposium on Formal Methods, FM 2014
Country	Singapore
City	Singapore
Period	12/05/14 → 16/05/14

Keywords

coercion
elections
signature attacks
single transferable vote

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40

Link to publication in Scopus

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

Wen, R., McIver, A., & Morgan, C. (2014). Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections. In C. Jones, P. Pihlajasaari, & J. Sun (Eds.), FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings (Vol. 8442 LNCS, pp. 595-610). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8442 LNCS). Cham, Switzerland: Springer, Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40

Wen, Roland ; McIver, Annabelle ; Morgan, Carroll. / Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections. FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings. editor / Cliff Jones ; Pekka Pihlajasaari ; Jun Sun. Vol. 8442 LNCS Cham, Switzerland : Springer, Springer Nature, 2014. pp. 595-610 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

@inproceedings{35ecfda2b14049419985222710dd9a0d,

title = "Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections",

abstract = "Electronic voting is rich with paradoxes. How can a voter verify that his own vote has been correctly counted, but at the same time be prevented from revealing his vote to a third party? Not only is there no generally recognised solution to those problems, it is not generally agreed how to specify precisely what the problems are, and what exact threats they pose. Such a situation is ripe for the application of Formal Methods. In this paper we explore so-called signature attacks, where an apparently secure system can nevertheless be manipulated to reveal a voter's choice in unexpected and subtle ways. We describe two examples in detail, and from that make proposals about where formal techniques might apply.",

keywords = "coercion, elections, signature attacks, single transferable vote",

author = "Roland Wen and Annabelle McIver and Carroll Morgan",

year = "2014",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40",

language = "English",

isbn = "9783319064093",

volume = "8442 LNCS",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

publisher = "Springer, Springer Nature",

pages = "595--610",

editor = "Cliff Jones and Pekka Pihlajasaari and Jun Sun",

booktitle = "FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings",

address = "United States",

}

Wen, R, McIver, A & Morgan, C 2014, Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections. in C Jones, P Pihlajasaari & J Sun (eds), FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings. vol. 8442 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8442 LNCS, Springer, Springer Nature, Cham, Switzerland, pp. 595-610, 19th International Symposium on Formal Methods, FM 2014, Singapore, Singapore, 12/05/14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40

Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections. / Wen, Roland; McIver, Annabelle; Morgan, Carroll.

FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings. ed. / Cliff Jones; Pekka Pihlajasaari; Jun Sun. Vol. 8442 LNCS Cham, Switzerland : Springer, Springer Nature, 2014. p. 595-610 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8442 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference proceeding contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections

AU - Wen, Roland

AU - McIver, Annabelle

AU - Morgan, Carroll

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Electronic voting is rich with paradoxes. How can a voter verify that his own vote has been correctly counted, but at the same time be prevented from revealing his vote to a third party? Not only is there no generally recognised solution to those problems, it is not generally agreed how to specify precisely what the problems are, and what exact threats they pose. Such a situation is ripe for the application of Formal Methods. In this paper we explore so-called signature attacks, where an apparently secure system can nevertheless be manipulated to reveal a voter's choice in unexpected and subtle ways. We describe two examples in detail, and from that make proposals about where formal techniques might apply.

AB - Electronic voting is rich with paradoxes. How can a voter verify that his own vote has been correctly counted, but at the same time be prevented from revealing his vote to a third party? Not only is there no generally recognised solution to those problems, it is not generally agreed how to specify precisely what the problems are, and what exact threats they pose. Such a situation is ripe for the application of Formal Methods. In this paper we explore so-called signature attacks, where an apparently secure system can nevertheless be manipulated to reveal a voter's choice in unexpected and subtle ways. We describe two examples in detail, and from that make proposals about where formal techniques might apply.

KW - coercion

KW - elections

KW - signature attacks

KW - single transferable vote

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84958532549&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40

M3 - Conference proceeding contribution

SN - 9783319064093

VL - 8442 LNCS

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 595

EP - 610

BT - FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings

A2 - Jones, Cliff

A2 - Pihlajasaari, Pekka

A2 - Sun, Jun

PB - Springer, Springer Nature

CY - Cham, Switzerland

ER -

Wen R, McIver A, Morgan C. Towards a formal analysis of information leakage for signature attacks in preferential elections. In Jones C, Pihlajasaari P, Sun J, editors, FM 2014: Formal Methods - 19th International Symposium, Proceedings. Vol. 8442 LNCS. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, Springer Nature. 2014. p. 595-610. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_40