TY - JOUR
T1 - Transaction costs, the opportunity cost of time and procrastination in charitable giving
AU - Knowles, Stephen
AU - Servátka, Maroš
PY - 2015/5/1
Y1 - 2015/5/1
N2 - We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations. People may intend to donate, but because of the transaction costs of doing so, postpone making the payment until they are less busy, and having postponed making the donation once, keep postponing. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. We find evidence of a transaction cost reducing donations, with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time, but no statistically significant evidence that giving people more time to donate increases procrastination and thus reduces donations.
AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations. People may intend to donate, but because of the transaction costs of doing so, postpone making the payment until they are less busy, and having postponed making the donation once, keep postponing. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. We find evidence of a transaction cost reducing donations, with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time, but no statistically significant evidence that giving people more time to donate increases procrastination and thus reduces donations.
KW - Charitable giving
KW - Dictator game
KW - Inattention
KW - Opportunity cost of time
KW - Procrastination
KW - Transaction costs
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84937761647&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84937761647
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 125
SP - 54
EP - 63
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
ER -