Elaborating on themes from Hobbes (1668/1994), Alfano (2016a) has argued that warranted trust fosters multiple practical, epistemic, cultural and mental health goods. In this paper, we focus on the practical and epistemic benefits made possible or more likely by warranted trust. In addition, we bear in mind throughout that trusting makes the trustor vulnerable: the trustee may prove to be unlucky, incompetent or an outright betrayer. With this in mind, we also focus on warranted lack of trust and outright distrust, the benefits they make possible, and the harms that the untrusting agent is protected against and may protect others against (see also D’Cruz, this volume). We use cases of (dis)trust in technology corporations and the public institutions that monitor and govern them as examples throughout this chapter.
|Title of host publication||The Routledge handbook of trust and philosophy|
|Place of Publication||New York ; London|
|Publisher||Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group|
|Number of pages||15|
|Publication status||Published - 2020|