Unconditionally secure disjointness tests for private datasets

Qingsong Ye*, Huaxiong Wang, Josef Pieprzyk, Xian Mo Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present two unconditional secure protocols for private set disjointness tests. In order to provide intuition of our protocols, we give a naive example that applies Sylvester matrices. Unfortunately, this simple construction is insecure as it reveals information about the intersection cardinality. More specifically, it discloses its lower bound. By using the Lagrange interpolation, we provide a protocol for the honest-but-curious case without revealing any additional information. Finally, we describe a protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries. In this protocol, a verification test is applied to detect misbehaving participants. Both protocols require O(1) rounds of communication. Our protocols are more efficient than the previous protocols in terms of communication and computation overhead. Unlike previous protocols whose security relies on computational assumptions, our protocols provide information theoretic security. To our knowledge, our protocols are the first ones that have been designed without a generic secure function evaluation. More important, they are the most efficient protocols for private disjointness tests in the malicious adversary case.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)225-235
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Applied Cryptography
Volume1
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2009

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