Understanding scepticism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is my contention that a number of prominent commentators on the problem of radical epistemological scepticism labour under a certain erroneous conception of what this problem involves. In particular, I argue that they tend to both underestimate and overestimate the issue that faces them. On the one hand, they are confused as to what would constitute a satisfactory answer to the sceptic. On the other, they concede far too much to the sceptic by failing to recognise that there are a number of defensive moves available to them, especially insofar as they endorse a version of epistemological externalism. In order to illustrate these claims, I focus upon Edward Craig's analysis of knowledge that, by his own admission, is unable to satisfactorily answer the challenge of radical scepticism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-123
Number of pages17
JournalSATS
Volume1
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2000
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Understanding scepticism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this