Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

Junsong Bian, Kin Keung Lai, Zhongsheng Hua

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the effects of downstream firms’ managerial incentives on upstream collusion. Downstream profit-and-revenue incentive schemes make upstream manufacturers easier to collude than a pure-profit incentive scheme does when retailers compete in prices. However, the opposite occurs under quantity competition.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-100
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics letters
Volume118
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • collusion
  • incentive
  • vertical channel
  • price and quantity competition

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