Variation of information as a measure of one-to-one causal specificity

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The interventionist account provides us with several notions permitting the qualification of causal relationships. In recent years, there has been a push toward formalizing these notions using information theory. In this paper, I discuss one of them, namely causal specificity. The notion of causal specificity is ambiguous as it can refer to at least two different concepts. After having presented these, I show that current attempts to formalize causal specificity in information theoretic terms have mostly focused on one of these two concepts. I then propose and apply a new information-theoretic measure which captures the other concept.

LanguageEnglish
Article number11
Pages1-18
Number of pages18
JournalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2019

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Specificity
Causal
Qualification
New Information
Information Theory

Keywords

  • Causal specificity
  • Causation
  • Information theory
  • Interventionist account

Cite this

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Variation of information as a measure of one-to-one causal specificity. / Bourrat, Pierrick.

In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 1, 11, 01.2019, p. 1-18.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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