Vectors of epistemic insecurity

Emily Sullivan, Mark Alfano

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


This chapter highlights the ways in which epistemic virtue and vice depend on the larger structure of one’s epistemic community. It addresses the way that modal epistemic standings and the virtues and vices that accompany these standings are networked. The chapter argues that safety in a social network context is best understood as vector-relativized. Given this framework, authors discuss the virtues and vices that are operative within the social epistemic context and how these dispositions related to attention, motivation and cognition, navigate the trade-offs between security and safety narrowly construed. They argue that understanding safety as vector-relativized brings modal epistemic standings in line with a truly social epistemology. Virtue epistemologists have largely neglected the ways in which epistemic virtue functions in social epistemic environments of inter-connected information sharers.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationVice epistemology
EditorsIan James Kidd, Heather Battaly, Quassim Cassam
Place of PublicationLondon ; New York
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781351380874, 9781315146058
ISBN (Print)9781138504431
Publication statusPublished - 2021


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