Venturinha and epistemic vertigo

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) discussion of the Wittgensteinian notion of epistemic vertigo in the context of the radical sceptical problematic, at least as that notion has been recently articulated by Duncan Pritchard (e.g., 2016).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1699-1704
Number of pages6
JournalPhilosophia (United States)
Volume48
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Epistemic vertigo
  • Epistemology
  • Hinge epistemology
  • Scepticism
  • Venturinha
  • Wittgenstein

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Venturinha and epistemic vertigo'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this