Veritism and epistemic value

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of Alvin Goldman's most distinctive contributions to epistemology, and there are many, concerns his development of a thorough-going reliabilism in the theory of knowledge. This chapter explores reasons for being sceptical about Goldman's treatment of the swamping problem. It argues that when the swamping problem is properly understood, then there is a very straightforward response available to Goldman. The chapter sets out the swamping problem and argues that it does not pose a challenge which is specific to reliabilism, but rather presents a challenge to a certain conception of epistemic value (known as veritism) which Goldman also endorses. It critically evaluates the first of Goldman's two responses to this problem, whereby he appeals to the greater future value of reliably formed true belief over mere true belief. The chapter also evaluates Goldman's second response to the swamping problem, which makes use of a process that he calls value autonomization.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGoldman and his critics
EditorsBrian P. McLaughlin, Hilary Kornblith
Place of PublicationOxford, UK
PublisherWiley-Blackwell, Wiley
Chapter9
Pages200-215
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9781118609378, 9781118609170
ISBN (Print)9780470673676
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NamePhilosophers and their critics
PublisherWiley Blackwell
Number16

Keywords

  • Alvin goldman
  • Epistemic value
  • Reliabilism
  • Swamping problem
  • Value autonomization
  • Veritism

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