Veritism and the goal of inquiry

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Elgin has offered us a powerful articulation of an epistemology that does not, contra veritism, have a concern for truth at its core. I contend that the case for Elgin’s alternative epistemological picture trades upon a faulty conception of what a veritistic epistemological outlook involves. In particular, I argue that the right conception of veritism—one that is fundamentally informed by the intellectual virtues—has none of the problematic consequences that Elgin claims. Relatedly, I maintain that we can account for the core role of objectual understanding in inquiry without thereby giving up on truth as the fundamental epistemic good (and even while granting that such understanding might well involve some false beliefs on the part of the subject).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1347-1359
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophia
Volume49
Issue number4
Early online date7 Jul 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Elgin, Catherine
  • Epistemic Value
  • Epistemology
  • Intellectual Virtue
  • Truth
  • Understanding
  • Veritism

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