Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Robust virtue epistemology contrasts with modest virtue epistemology, which aims to offer, at most, a necessary condition on knowledge along virtue-theoretic lines. In outline, the guiding idea behind robust virtue epistemology is that there is more to knowledge than the conjunction of cognitive success and the exercise of cognitive agency (i.e., of a kind that might generate justification). In effect, what robust virtue epistemology is proposing is a particularly full-blooded way of thinking about the ability platitude. Robust virtue epistemology is a very attractive proposal, and not just because of the elegant way that it deals with the Gettier problem. The first horn concerns whether robust virtue epistemology offers an account of knowledge that is strong enough to exclude cases of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. The challenge just presented to robust virtue epistemology alleges that the view is not strong enough, in that some cases involving knowledge-undermining epistemic luck get treated as genuine instances of knowledge.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology
EditorsHeather Battaly
Place of PublicationNew York ; London
PublisherRoutledge, Taylor and Francis Group
Chapter23
Pages285-295
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9781317495291
ISBN (Print)9781138890206
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

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