Virtue epistemology and epistemic twin earth

Jesper Kallestrup*, Duncan Pritchard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

62 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A popular form of virtue epistemology - defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco - holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)335-357
Number of pages23
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Volume22
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2014
Externally publishedYes

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