Virtue epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The recent literature on the theory of knowledge has taken a distinctive turn by focusing on the role of the cognitive and intellectual virtues in the acquisition of knowledge. The main contours and motivations for such virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge are here sketched and it is argued that virtue epistemology in its most plausible form can be regarded as a refined form of reliabilism, and thus a variety of epistemic externalism. Moreover, it is claimed that there is strong empirical support in favour of the virtue epistemic position so understood, and an empirical study regarding the cognitive processes employed by medical experts in their diagnosis and treatment of epilepsy is cited in this regard. In general, it is argued that one can best account for ‘expert’ knowledge in terms of a virtue-theoretic epistemology that retains key reliabilist features. It is thus shown that understanding knowledge along virtue-theoretic lines has important implications for our understanding of how knowledge is acquired, and thus for the philosophy of education.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)229-243
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Explorations
Volume8
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2005
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Virtue epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this