This chapter addresses the three questions on the unity of consciousness: What is the unity of consciousness? Is consciousness necessarily unified? How can the unity of consciousness be explained? The central project is to isolate a notion of unity on which the unity thesis is both substantive and plausible - this chapter aims to find a more precise version of the unity thesis that is neither trivially true nor obviously false. It looks at certain arguments that have been made against the unity of consciousness, to determine whether they are good arguments against the unity thesis. And finally, after fleshing out the unity thesis further, the chapter applies the thesis to certain currently popular philosophical theories of consciousness, arguing that the thesis is incompatible with these theories: if the unity thesis is true, then these theories are false.
|Title of host publication||The Unity of Consciousness|
|Subtitle of host publication||Binding, Integration, and Dissociation|
|Place of Publication||Oxford, UK|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Number of pages||36|
|Publication status||Published - 22 Mar 2003|