TY - GEN
T1 - Who is telling the truth…… cognitive processes in meta-deductive reasoning
AU - Byrne, Ruth M. J.
AU - Johnson-Laird, P. N.
AU - Handley, Simon J.
PY - 1993
Y1 - 1993
N2 - How can the mechanisms underlying both human and computer reasoning develop to deal with novel or complex inferences ? The answer may lie in research in the cognitive science of me ta-deductions. Some meta-deductions, such as the inferences we make when we try to think about what other people are thinking, are central to successful social and professional interactions, and to the interactions of people with computers. Other meta-deductions, such as the inferences we make when we try to work out the truth or falsity of alternative states of affairs, can seem both novel and complex. Consider, for example, an island inhabited by two sorts of people, knights who always tell the truth, and knaves who always lie. Suppose you overhear a conversation between two of these individuals. A asserts, I am a knight and B is a knight. B asserts, A is a knave. Can you work out whether A is a knight or a knave, and whether B is a knight or a knave? In this chapter, we examine experimental data on the sorts of inferences that human reasoners make from these puzzles. The data help us to chose from among the programs developed to simulate theories of the mechanisms underlying these inferences.
AB - How can the mechanisms underlying both human and computer reasoning develop to deal with novel or complex inferences ? The answer may lie in research in the cognitive science of me ta-deductions. Some meta-deductions, such as the inferences we make when we try to think about what other people are thinking, are central to successful social and professional interactions, and to the interactions of people with computers. Other meta-deductions, such as the inferences we make when we try to work out the truth or falsity of alternative states of affairs, can seem both novel and complex. Consider, for example, an island inhabited by two sorts of people, knights who always tell the truth, and knaves who always lie. Suppose you overhear a conversation between two of these individuals. A asserts, I am a knight and B is a knight. B asserts, A is a knave. Can you work out whether A is a knight or a knave, and whether B is a knight or a knave? In this chapter, we examine experimental data on the sorts of inferences that human reasoners make from these puzzles. The data help us to chose from among the programs developed to simulate theories of the mechanisms underlying these inferences.
U2 - 10.1007/978-1-4471-3562-3_14
DO - 10.1007/978-1-4471-3562-3_14
M3 - Conference proceeding contribution
SN - 9781447135623
T3 - Workshops in computing
SP - 221
EP - 233
BT - AI and cognitive Science ’91
A2 - Sorenson, Humphrey
PB - Springer, Springer Nature
CY - London
T2 - Irish Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science (4th : 1991)
Y2 - 19 September 1991 through 20 September 1991
ER -