Why do central banks intervene secretly?. Preliminary evidence from the BoJ

Michel Beine; Oscar Bernal

doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2005.12.003

Why do central banks intervene secretly?. Preliminary evidence from the BoJ

Michel Beine^*, Oscar Bernal

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the main determinants of secret interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market. Using the recent experience of the Bank of Japan, we estimate a model that explains the share of secret to reported interventions in the FX market. Two sets of determinants are clearly identified: the first is related to the probability of detection of the central bank orders by market participants; the second to the central bank's internal decision to opt for secrecy. Our estimations support the arguments of current microstructure theories that rationalize the use of secret interventions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	291-306
Number of pages	16
Journal	Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Volume	17
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2005.12.003
Publication status	Published - Jul 2007

Keywords

Central bank interventions
Exchange rates market
Secrecy puzzle

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10.1016/j.intfin.2005.12.003

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