Why Frankfurt examples don't beg the question: a reply to Woodward

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In a recent article in the Journal of Social Philosophy, Paul Woodward argues
    that “Frankfurt examples” (as he calls them; hereafter FEs) beg the question
    against incompatibilists. FEs, named after Harry Frankfurt, who first noticed
    their apparent importance, are designed to show that alternative possibili-
    ties are not necessary for moral responsibility. Woodward claims that they do
    no such thing. If he is right, this is an important finding, which would bring
    an entire philosophical cottage industry to a halt, since FEs have provided the
    focus around which a great deal of recent work on moral responsibility has
    turned. In this paper, I will show that Woodward is not right: For all he
    shows, at least, there is no significant sense in which FEs beg the question
    against incompatibilists. The demands Woodward makes upon proponents
    of FEs cannot be met, not because there is anything fallacious about FEs, but
    because these demands are out of place in moral philosophy. Incompatibilists
    who reject FEs, as much as their proponents, must rely upon the kind of argu-
    mentative strategies Woodward condemns.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)211-215
    Number of pages5
    JournalJournal of Social Philosophy
    Volume35
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jun 2004

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