Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo

Cameron Boult, Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva's book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the 'framework reading' that she offers of Wittgenstein's On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view-viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account of the meta-sceptical problem which this proposal generates, which we call epistemic vertigo.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-35
Number of pages9
JournalPhilosophia (United States)
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes


  • Moore, G. E.
  • Reasons
  • Scepticism
  • Wittgenstein


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