Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0008

Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism

Duncan Pritchard^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter offers a moderate fideistic account of the epistemology of religious belief, one that takes on board the account of the structure of reasons offered by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Like standard forms of fideism, this position holds that the theist's belief in God's existence is lacking in rational support. Unlike standard forms of fideism, however, this position also holds that most religious beliefs can nonetheless enjoy rational support.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion
Editors	Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Place of Publication	Oxford
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	145-159
Number of pages	15
Volume	4
ISBN (Electronic)	9780191742163
ISBN (Print)	9780199656417
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0008
Publication status	Published - 30 Aug 2012
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Epistemology
God
On certainty
Reasons
Religious belief
Theism

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10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0008

Cite this

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Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism

Abstract

Keywords

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