Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter offers a moderate fideistic account of the epistemology of religious belief, one that takes on board the account of the structure of reasons offered by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Like standard forms of fideism, this position holds that the theist's belief in God's existence is lacking in rational support. Unlike standard forms of fideism, however, this position also holds that most religious beliefs can nonetheless enjoy rational support.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion
EditorsJonathan L. Kvanvig
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages145-159
Number of pages15
Volume4
ISBN (Electronic)9780191742163
ISBN (Print)9780199656417
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Aug 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Epistemology
  • God
  • On certainty
  • Reasons
  • Religious belief
  • Theism

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