Wright contra McDowell on perceptual knowledge and scepticism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell's view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he may or may not agree with), can be shown to be a viable alternative to Wright's anti-sceptical proposal, one that retains the driving motivation behind Wright's proposal while avoiding one of its most fundamental problems. Wright's wholesale rejection of the McDowellian anti-sceptical strategy is thus premature.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)467-479
Number of pages13
JournalSynthese
Volume171
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Discrimination
  • Epistemic externalism/internalism distinction
  • Epistemology
  • Reasons
  • Scepticism

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