You meta believe it

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Because of the privileged place of beliefs in explaining behaviour, mismatch cases—in which agents sincerely claim to believe that p, but act in a way that is inconsistent with that belief—have attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, I argue that some of these cases, at least, are at least partially explained by agents believing that they believe that p, while failing to believe that p. Agents in these cases do not believe that ~p; rather, they have an indistinct first-order, beliefy, representation that p. The indistinctness of this first-order representation provides the leeway for the inconsistency seen in their behaviour.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)814-826
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Volume26
Issue number2
Early online date24 Mar 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2018

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